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Pre-analysis plan for the impact of the introduction of leniency on bribery prosecutions in China

Last registered on July 17, 2015

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Pre-analysis plan for the impact of the introduction of leniency on bribery prosecutions in China
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0000781
Initial registration date
July 17, 2015

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 17, 2015, 4:35 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
July 17, 2015, 4:40 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
SITE

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2015-08-01
End date
2015-08-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party passed on 23 October 2014 a "Decision concerning Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance According to Law" which stressed the current government's strong commitment to ght corruption. Among other measures, heavier penalties, including death penalty, are envisaged for those o ering bribes, and severe restrictions to the leniency o ffered to bribe-givers. In order to understand the Chinese officials' dissatisfaction with the current legislation, which was introduced in 1997, we collected data on the investigations of bribery and public official corruption, available for most Chinese provinces for the period 1986-2010. The available evidence so far points to a substantial reduction in the number of major corruption cases around the 1997 reform, raising questions on the motivations for the newly proposed policy change.
However the data on prosecutions are subject to several limitations, in particular they cannot help disentangle deterrence from detection, or criminal activity from prosecution e fforts, nor the details of the reform that produce the impact and through which channels. Moreover, some aspects of the legislative reform, such as the provision of leniency for the bribe-giver, were already in place since 1988. For this reason, we plan to collect and analyze more in depth a strati fied random sample of prosecution case fi les between 1980 and 2010. Given that the sample size will be determined by power and budget considerations, we cannot gain any insight from these new data about the incidence of bribery in general.
We can instead observe the impact of the legislative reform on specifi c details of the corrupt behavior, and the mechanisms through which this behavior occurs or is deterred.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Berlin, Maria. 2015. "Pre-analysis plan for the impact of the introduction of leniency on bribery prosecutions in China." AEA RCT Registry. July 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.781-2.0
Former Citation
Berlin, Maria. 2015. "Pre-analysis plan for the impact of the introduction of leniency on bribery prosecutions in China." AEA RCT Registry. July 17. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/781/history/4792
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2015-08-01
Intervention End Date
2015-08-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Share of cases initiated by the bribe-giver or by an innocent whitness. After the introduction of leniency, we should in general expect a higher frequency of cases in which the bribe-giver comes forth and reports the crime to the authorities. However this will also depend by the severity of sanctions and the actual likelihood of obtaining leniency in practice.

Size of the bribe, value of the favor exchanged, income or status of the bribe-giver (and the bribe-taker). If the reform, through the introduction of leniency, makes detection easier because of the incentives provided to the bribe-giver, this amounts to an increase in the expected fine (even aside the actual increase in sanctions) for the bribe-taker. We expect this to lead to an increase of bribe size: the threshold to unertake corrupt behavior is now raised, hence individuals will only exchange bribes if the returns from this corrupt agreement are higher. In other words, we expect cases of petty corruption to be deterred to a larger extent. In reading the cases we might nd some proxies of the value of the corrupt deal for the bribe-giver, or use as a proxy some measure of her income or status.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We select a sample of prosecution case files to be read and analyzed in detail. The total number is determined by a power calculation. A Chinese law student that we hired for the purpose will access all the documents related to the cases in the Procuratorates' archives, read through them and extract for us information about the outcomes that we specified.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Prosecution case.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
120-300 cases depending on cost.
Sample size: planned number of observations
120-300 cases depending on cost.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50% cases pre-reform, 50% cases post-reform.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Power calculations in attached analysis plan.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials