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Pre-analysis plan for the impact of the introduction of leniency on bribery prosecutions in China

Last registered on September 16, 2015
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Pre-analysis plan for the impact of the introduction of leniency on bribery prosecutions in China
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0000781
Initial registration date
July 17, 2015

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 17, 2015, 4:35 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
September 16, 2015, 3:43 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
China
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Maria Berlin
Affiliation
SITE
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Giancarlo Spagnolo
PI Affiliation
SITE, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Eief, CEPR
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2015-08-01
End date
2015-10-31
Keywords
Governance
Additional Keywords
corruption, bribery, legislative reform
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
One-sided leniency policies and asymmetric punishment are regarded as potentially powerful anti-corruption tools, also in the light of their success in busting price-fixing cartels. It has been argued, however, that the introduction of these policies in China in 1997 has not helped fighting corruption. Consistent with this view, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party passed on 23 October 2014 a Decision concerning Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance According to Law which stressed the current government’s strong commitment to fight corruption introducing heavier penalties but also severe restrictions of leniency offered to bribe-givers. Claims on the effects of the 1997 reform are not backed by data, to our knowledge, while evaluating the effects of a policy on crimes like corruption is difficult. These crimes are typically only observed if detected and convicted by the police, and an increase in observed convictions may as well be due to an increase in the total number of crimes rather than to a positive effect of the policy. We collected data on the investigations of bribery and public official corruption, available for most Chinese provinces for the period 1986-2010. The available evidence so far points to a substantial and stable reduction in the number of major corruption cases around the 1997 reform, a result per se ambiguous but consistent with a positive deterrence effect of the 1997 reform. Here we describe the planned case study analysis under way to corroborate and help the interpretation of these preliminary findings.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Berlin, Maria and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2015. "Pre-analysis plan for the impact of the introduction of leniency on bribery prosecutions in China." AEA RCT Registry. September 16. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.781-4.0
Former Citation
Berlin, Maria and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2015. "Pre-analysis plan for the impact of the introduction of leniency on bribery prosecutions in China." AEA RCT Registry. September 16. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/781/history/5297
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2015-08-01
Intervention End Date
2015-10-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Relative incidence of harassment bribes in the total. Looking at the prosecution documents we can first of all form a better idea of whether the presence of improper benefit is actually considered in practice, and so whether harassment bribes are effectively set apart and subject to a different discipline (in particular, the exemption from punishment for the giver). Further, if this is the case, we can observe whether the 1997 reform led to a change in this respect, and hence on the frequency of harassment bribes relative to other types of bribery among the cases detected.

Relative incidence of report by the bribe-giver. Ideally we would want to know whether the case was initiated by a spontaneous report, at least for harassment bribes: after the introduction of asymmetric punishment, we should in general expect a higher frequency of cases in which the (no longer guilty) bribe-givers come forth and report the crime to the authorities. For the other class of bribes, the introduction of leniency can have an ambiguous effect. Among other things this will depend on the severity of sanctions and the actual likelihood of obtaining leniency. Unfortunately the information on how the case was initiated is not available in the case files. There is however some indication of whether the defendant volunteered information if leniency was awarded.

Size of the bribe, size of the return, income or status of the bribe-giver (and the bribe-taker) If the reform, through the introduction of leniency and asymmetric punishment, makes detection easier because of the incentives provided to the bribe-giver, this amounts to an increase in the expected fine for the bribe-taker (even though the actual sanctions decrease). We expect this to lead to an increase of bribe size for distortionary bribes: the threshold to undertake corrupt behavior is now raised, hence individuals will only exchange bribes if the returns from this corrupt agreement are higher. The picture is different though for harassment bribes, when the bribe-giver is not expected to give back the gain. In this case incentives to report increase with the size of the bribe, so the larger bribes will be deterred to a larger extent.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We select a sample of prosecution case files to be read and analyzed in detail. The total number is determined by a power calculation. A Chinese law student that we hired for the purpose will access all the documents related to the cases in the Procuratorates' archives, read through them and extract for us information about the outcomes that we specified.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Prosecution case.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
300-2000 cases depending on cost.
Sample size: planned number of observations
300-2000 cases depending on cost.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50% cases pre-reform, 50% cases post-reform.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Power calculations in attached analysis plan.
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials