Cash versus share auctions: An experimental study

Last registered on July 13, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Cash versus share auctions: An experimental study
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0007950
Initial registration date
July 12, 2021
Last updated
July 13, 2021, 9:35 AM EDT

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Otago

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Bath
PI Affiliation
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2021-02-03
End date
2022-02-02
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Almost all the existing literature on auctions – theoretical and experimental – focuses on the case when bidders make cash bids. In recent auction practice, however, bidders often can make share bids; that is, they bid a share of the future cash flow that is generated after winning the auction. In this experimental study, we investigate bidding behavior in the context of share auctions, both for first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions, and compare it to bidding behavior in cash auctions.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Bajoori, Elnaz, Ronald Peeters and Leonard Wolk. 2021. "Cash versus share auctions: An experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. July 13. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7950-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2021-07-15
Intervention End Date
2021-11-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Improve our understanding of the functioning and performance of equity auctions.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment will be conducted online using oTree and participants will be recruited using Prolific.

Participants are, in pairs, bidding to take over a hypothetical company. The future profit (i.e., the value) of the company is uncertain, but bidders receive independently a signal regarding the probabilities associated with the possible profit levels. The distributions over the future profit levels are such that those for higher signals first-order stochastically dominate those for lower signals.

We have a 2x2 between-subjects design. One treatment dimension concerns the auction format being a first-price or a second-price sealed-bid auction. The other treatment dimension is whether bids are cash amounts or shares of the future profit.

Each treatment will be run following a strategy method: bidders specify their bid for each of the possible signals they can receive.
After having made their bidding decisions, there will be a short survey in which we ask few demographic questions and elicit their risk/loss attitude and risk literacy.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
All randomizations are computerized.
Randomization Unit
The randomizations are on individual level.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1
Sample size: planned number of observations
200-240 participants (independent observations).
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50-60 participants (independent observations) per treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Vrije Universiteit School of Business and Economics Research Ethics Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2021-06-28
IRB Approval Number
SBE6/28/2021kwk350
Analysis Plan

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