Pooling to mediocre Fairness and Strategic Ignorance

Last registered on September 16, 2021
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Pooling to mediocre Fairness and Strategic Ignorance
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0008226
Initial registration date
September 15, 2021

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
September 16, 2021, 10:32 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Germany
Region
NRW

Primary Investigator

Name
Solin Rafiq
Affiliation
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Fabian Bopp
PI Affiliation
University Paderborn
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2021-09-15
End date
2021-09-30
Keywords
Behavior, Lab
Additional Keywords
Decision Making, Self-image, Information Avoidance, Strategic Ignorance
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In the experimental study, we are exploring how the existence of mediocre selfish allocation is affecting the behavior in the hidden information game. We are able to observe whether not informing oneself and remain ignorant can be explained by a preference for pooling between a fair and unfair allocation.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Bopp, Fabian and Solin Rafiq. 2021. "Pooling to mediocre Fairness and Strategic Ignorance." AEA RCT Registry. September 16. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8226-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The intervention consists of an additionally added mediocre option in the hidden information treatment of moral wiggle room game by Dana Weber Krupka (2007).
Intervention Start Date
2021-09-15
Intervention End Date
2021-09-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The key outcome variable is whether participants reveal information on the effect of their action on another person. The decision is binary.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
The secondary outcome is the allocation chosen given the subject's first decision.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
In the game, the subject can choose between different options. In the beginning, the subjects are uninformed about the effect of their choices on the other person. They can decide to learn how much a second subject would receive based on their choice. In the next step they can choose either being informed or remaining uninformed they can make their choice.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experimental design is a variation of the dictator game firstly initiated by DWK. There will be a session in which participants have to choose between two payoff options in which the payoff information for the "Dictator" is visible while the payoff information for the "Receiver" is not determined. Participants can choose whether or not to "Reveal" the payoff information for the second player before making their final decision. Afterwards, in the second session participants will be offered two chances to change their decision and choose among four instead of two payoffs.
Experimental Design Details
The experimental design is a variation of the dictator game firstly initiated by DWK. There will be a session in which participants have to choose between two payoff options in which the payoff information for the "Dictator" is visible while the payoff information for the "Receiver" is not determined. One of the options provides a high amount of payoff to the "Dictator" but a low amount of payoff to the "Receiver"- Conflict Interest Game. The other option is welfare optimal- Aligned Interest game. Participants can choose whether or not to "Reveal" the payoff information for the second player before making their final decision. Afterwards, in the second session participants will be offered two chances to change their decision and choose among four instead of two payoffs. One of the new payoff options provides a middle solution as it gives a high amount of payoff to the "Dictator" and a mediocre amount to the "Receiver". The other option provides a decreased amount to the "Dictator" as well as a very low amount to the "Receiver".
Randomization Method
Randomization is done by computer.
Randomization Unit
individual level
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1
Sample size: planned number of observations
120 Observations
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
120 subjects. By design, we use a within comparison only varying the order to control for order effects.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethik-Kommission der Universität Paderborn
IRB Approval Date
2021-09-03
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials