Double auction experiment of certified environmental values

Last registered on January 24, 2022
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Double auction experiment of certified environmental values
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0008855
Initial registration date
January 22, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 24, 2022, 9:11 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Japan
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Tadahiro Ikemoto
Affiliation
Kyoto University
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Takanori Ida
PI Affiliation
Kyoto University
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PI Name
Kenju Kamei
PI Affiliation
Durham University
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PI Name
Morimitsu Kurino
PI Affiliation
Keio University
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2022-01-24
End date
2022-02-17
Keywords
Environment & Energy
Additional Keywords
double auction, online experiment, environmental value
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We plan to conduct online experimental double auctions of certified environmental values in order to verify whether information on bid and ask prices of other participants will have any impact on bid, ask and market prices. Participants from distinct corporations will be divided into three intervention groups. Information on ongoing transactions of all participants in the same group will be shown in the first one during each session but not in the second or third ones. Buyers in the third one will not be able to set the price.
Each corporation subject participates in five consecutive one-day experimental sessions (which will be run every two business days). A pre-treatment session will also be run before interventions. Each team consists of seven buyers and one seller, and will be randomly assigned to one of three intervention groups. The team composition and the assigned treatment condition remain the same throughout the five experiment sessions. Subjects engage in double auctions only in their own teams. After the fifth experimental session, one of five sessions will be chosen randomly for payments (random incentive scheme).
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Ida, Takanori et al. 2022. "Double auction experiment of certified environmental values." AEA RCT Registry. January 24. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8855-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We will conduct experimental double auctions of certified environmental values. Participants from distinct corporations will be divided into 3 intervention groups. Information on ongoing transactions of all participants in the same group will be shown in the first one during each session but not in the second or third ones. Buyers in the third one will not be able to set the price. There will be no limitation on price or amount settings. Buyers will be at their own expense. Each subject participates in five consecutive one-day experimental sessions (which will be run every two business days). A pre-treatment session will also be run before interventions. Each team consists of seven buyers and one seller, with partner matching: the team composition does not change in the experiment. Each team (the unit of double auction market) will be randomly assigned to one of 3 intervention groups. After the fifth experimental session, one of five sessions will be chosen randomly for payments.
Intervention Start Date
2022-01-24
Intervention End Date
2022-02-17

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Each deal of five and a pre-treatment sessions.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
All bid, ask and market prices will be collected.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Experimental auction as described above.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization will be done by assigning computer generated random numbers to participants.
Randomization Unit
Each participant will be randomly assigned to an intervention group.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
We plan to have a total of 192 corporation subjects (168 buyers and 24 sellers). Each of the three intervention groups has 64 subjects. The number of clusters is eight per group. Each cluster, which we call “team” in this document, consists of seven buyers and one seller. The team composition does not change throughout the five consecutive experiment sessions.
Sample size: planned number of observations
Each team participates in one pre-treatment session and five one-day experimental sessions in their assigned treatment condition. Hence, we collect observations of 144 double-auction markets in total (= 3 intervention groups X 8 teams per intervention groups X 6 days per team)
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Each treatment has 56 buyers and 8 sellers. The number of clusters is eight per treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Kyoto University
IRB Approval Date
2021-11-15
IRB Approval Number
No.2021045
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials