Scientific information as a coordination device in voting over climate policy instruments. Evidence from a survey experiment with real climate impacts

Last registered on July 08, 2022
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Scientific information as a coordination device in voting over climate policy instruments. Evidence from a survey experiment with real climate impacts
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0009307
Initial registration date
July 05, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 08, 2022, 9:29 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Germany
Region
National

Primary Investigator

Name
Johannes Jarke-Neuert
Affiliation
University of Hamburg
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Manuel Frondel
PI Affiliation
Ruhr-Universität Bochum / RWI Leibniz Institute of Economics
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Grischa Perino
PI Affiliation
University of Hamburg
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Daniela Flörchinger
PI Affiliation
RWI Leibniz Institute of Economics
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2022-07-18
End date
2022-08-05
Keywords
Behavior, Environment & Energy, Governance
Additional Keywords
climate action, policy instruments, information, emissions trading, cap-and-trade, coal phase-out
JEL code(s)
C93, D02, D83, D91, H41, Q54, Q58
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
While first-order beliefs about a policy’s impacts shape preferences over policy options, how these preferences are expressed in ballots or other voting contexts is often influenced by strategic considerations. Against this backround, two questions are addressed in this study: (1) How do first and second-order beliefs on the effectiveness of climate policy instruments affect policy choices in collective relative to individual decisions? (2) Is scientific information able to co-ordinate second-order beliefs and choices in ballots?
In this experiment participants can choose between real climate mitigation options that mimic real-world climate policy instruments. We compare an abstract mitigation option, i.e. the reduction of the cap in the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS), with a concrete, intuitive and prominent option, i.e. the reductions of emissions from a coal-fired power plant in Germany, and with a linear combination of the two. Subjects sequentially choose both individually and collectively. The collective choice is implemented in the form of a ballot where one of the three mitigation options must obtain at least 50 percent of votes to be implemented. It is designed to determine the role of strategic considerations in voting decisions on specific climate policies and whether scientific information on instrument effectiveness can serve as a coordination device. It allows testing whether collective choices respond more sensitive to commonly shared information than individual choices.
Two between-subjects conditions are compared. In a control condition, no further information on the true effect of each alternative on total CO2 emissions is given. In a treatment condition, information on the true effect of each alternative on total CO2 emissions under the current rules of the EU ETS are given before subjects make their first decision. Four hypotheses are tested with this design: (1) In both conditions, first-order beliefs better explain individual choices than votes, and second-order beliefs better explain votes than choices. (2) Without additional information on the climate effectiveness of options, participants are less likely to vote for the abstract and less prominent option to reduce the number of allowances in the EU ETS in the collective decision context than in the individual choice. (3) In the collective choice and with additional information on the climate effectiveness of options, allowance retirement is chosen more often than in the individual choice, and more often than in the collective choice without additional information on the climate effectiveness of options. (4) Collective choices tend to favor mixes over extremes, i.e. the linear combination option is chosen more likely in the collective vs. the individual choice.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Flörchinger, Daniela et al. 2022. "Scientific information as a coordination device in voting over climate policy instruments. Evidence from a survey experiment with real climate impacts." AEA RCT Registry. July 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9307-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

Sponsors

Partner

Name
forsa Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische Analysen
Type
private_company
URL
https://www.forsa.de/1/
Name
ForTomorrow gGmbH
Type
private_company
URL
https://www.fortomorrow.eu/
Name
STEAG GmbH
Type
private_company
URL
https://www.steag.com/en/
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
In this experiment participants can choose between real climate mitigation options that mimic real-world climate policy instruments. We compare an abstract mitigation option, i.e. the reduction of the cap in the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS), with a concrete, intuitive and prominent option, i.e. the reductions of emissions from a coal-fired power plant in Germany, and with a linear combination of the two. In the individual choice situation, the participants in our experiment are free to choose between the following four options:
• A: Reducing the number of allowances in the EU ETS by 10 tons of CO2.
• B: Reducing the emissions from a coal-fired power plant in Germany by 10 tons.
• C: Mixed option with 5 tons each via A and B .
• D: No climate action.
In the collective choice situation, the options are the same but all CO2 reductions are multiplied by ten, i.e. each mitigation option amounts to one hundred tons of CO2. This is to keep the total impact of all decisions within a treatment roughly constant across individual and collective decisions. Ten (one hundred) tons of CO2 are roughly equivalent to the carbon footprint of one (ten) average German citizen(s). Participants are informed that decisions are real in that the choices of randomly selected participants will be implemented with the help of the operator of a coal-fired power plant and an NGO that retires EU ETS allowances . Furthermore, we elicit participants' beliefs about the effectiveness of all options in reducing total GHG emission in the EU.
The collective choice is implemented in the form of a ballot where one of the three mitigation options must obtain at least 50 percent of votes to be implemented. It is designed to determine the role of strategic considerations in voting decisions on specific climate policies and whether scientific information on instrument effectiveness can serve as a coordination device. It allows testing whether collective choices respond more sensitive to commonly shared information than individual choices.
Each subject makes two sequential decisions with the following within-subjects variation: in the first decision (d=1), subjects choose individually and independently between alternatives A, B, C and D. In the second decision (d=2), subjects vote individually and independently for one of the alternatives and the choice is implemented collectively by majority rule, as described above.
There are two between-subjects conditions. In the control condition COLCTL (code z=0), no further information on the true effect of each alternative on total CO2 emissions is given. In the COLCR (code z=1) condition, information on the true effect of each alternative on total CO2 emissions under the current rules of the EU ETS are given before subjects make their first decision.
Intervention Start Date
2022-07-18
Intervention End Date
2022-08-05

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
A four-point categorial variable that codes the individual choices d=1 and d=2 for each subject:
A: Reducing the number of allowances in the EU ETS by 10 tons of CO2.
B: Reducing the emissions from a coal-fired power plant in Germany by
10 tons.
C: Mixed option with 5 tons each via A and B .
D: No climate action.
See supporting document for further details.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Participants’ first-order beliefs about the effectiveness of all options in reducing total GHG emission in the EU, and the second-order beliefs regardings the beliefs of the other participants.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
See supporting document.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization done at survey start by a computer (pseudo-random number generator).
Randomization Unit
Individual-subject-level randomization.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1,200 individuals subjects.
Sample size: planned number of observations
1,200 individuals subjects.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
The target sample sizes are 600 subjects in both conditions, respectively.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

Documents

Document Name
Supporting Document for the AEA RCT Pre-Registration AEARCTR-0009307, "Scientific information as a coordination device in voting over climate policy instruments. Evidence from a survey experiment with real climate impacts"
Document Type
other
Document Description
Details on the motivation, choice task, experimental conditions, and hypotheses.
File
Supporting Document for the AEA RCT Pre-Registration AEARCTR-0009307, "Scientific information as a coordination device in voting over climate policy instruments. Evidence from a survey experiment with real climate impacts"

MD5: 8b68a3495df228db646c6135caf9d087

SHA1: 10e60030202e8ce11b0480f72bbd1409520b18ae

Uploaded At: July 05, 2022

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Dean's Office of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at Universität Hamburg
IRB Approval Date
2022-06-09
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials