Rank Incentives within Firms

Last registered on December 17, 2015

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Rank Incentives within Firms

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0000981

Initial registration date

December 17, 2015

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

December 17, 2015, 8:12 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

Bangladesh

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Anik Ashraf

Affiliation

University of Warwick

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status

On going

Start date

2015-10-01

End date

2017-05-25

Keywords

Labor

Additional Keywords

Development, Organizational Economics

JEL code(s)

Secondary IDs

Abstract

This study aims at understanding whether provision of information to workers on their relative performance can increase their productivity, and if it does, what are the mechanisms that drive such change. The information is delivered in the form of ranks computed from their performances in the previous month. This study is in collaboration with a Bangladeshi sweater factory, where the workers are paid based on a piece-rate scheme. I introduce rank information to treatment group workers in two different forms - private and public. The outcomes of key interest are productivity, absenteeism, quality of outputs, cooperation, and communication across workers.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Ashraf, Anik. 2015. "Rank Incentives within Firms." AEA RCT Registry. December 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.981-1.0

Former Citation

Ashraf, Anik. 2015. "Rank Incentives within Firms." AEA RCT Registry. December 17. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/981/history/6366

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention Start Date

2015-12-26

Intervention End Date

2016-09-25

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

The outcomes of key interest are productivity, absenteeism, quality of outputs, cooperation, and communication across workers.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

This study is conducted with workers from the manual knitting section of a sweater factory in Bangladesh, where workers knit sweater parts for monthly compensation based on piece rates. There are 380 such workers divided into 15 administrative groups called 'blocks'. The workers will be randomly assigned into one of three different experimental groups through a public lottery. These groups consist of one control group and two treatment groups. Workers in the treatment groups receive information about their relative ranks among their peers (within their respective treatment groups), while the specific kind of information they receive varies across the two groups. The ranks are computed from the average time a worker takes to complete jobs of each style assigned to him. In the first treatment group each worker gets to know only about his own rank, and no one knows anyone else's rank - the information provided is thus 'private' in nature. In the second treatment group, all the workers get to know each other's ranks - the information provided is thus 'public' in nature. The treatment will be provided through individual letters delivered on a monthly basis, while the ranks will be computed based on their performances in the previous month. To negate any effect caused by introduction of letters and not the information per se, the control group will also receive letters but with minimal summary statistics of performance within their group, something that does not introduce rank incentives in the control group and will also be included in the treatment group letters.

As already mentioned, the randomization will be done at worker level. But before workers are drawn into the experimental groups, each of the 15 blocks will be randomly selected into one of two categories. The first category of blocks will have relatively more 'public' treatment workers than 'private'. The second category of blocks will have the opposite - relatively more 'private' treatment workers than 'public'.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Public Lottery

Randomization Unit

In this factory, workers work in administrative groups called 'blocks'. At first, we randomly assign each of the blocks into one of two different categories - (i) 'block' with relatively bigger share of 'private' treatment, and (ii) 'block' with relatively bigger share of 'public' treatment.

In the second step, we randomly assign workers of each block into one of one control and two treatment groups through a public lottery.

Was the treatment clustered?