Community contributions and local public goods

Last registered on July 28, 2023
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Community contributions and local public goods
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011844
Initial registration date
July 26, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 28, 2023, 2:05 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Bangladesh
Region
Bogra and Gaibandha Districts

Primary Investigator

Name
Anna Tompsett
Affiliation
Stockholm University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Serena Cocciolo
PI Affiliation
PI Name
Selene Ghisolfi
PI Affiliation
PI Name
Md. Ahasan Habib
PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2015-08-15
End date
2018-05-31
Keywords
Environment & Energy, Governance, Health
Additional Keywords
public goods, community contribution requirements, self-targeting
JEL code(s)
D82, H41, O10, O20
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Community contribution requirements are a ubiquitous but understudied feature of projects to provide local public goods in developing countries. A randomized experiment in rural Bangladesh shows that cash contribution requirements strongly reduce take-up and impact of safe drinking water infrastructure projects, compared to a contribution waiver. Labour contribution requirements do not, despite having similar value if priced at the market wage, because most households value their time below the market wage and because labour contributions appear less costly to coordinate. Neither contribution requirement increases cost-effectiveness once we account for coordination and monitoring costs, undermining a central rationale for their imposition.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Cocciolo, Serena et al. 2023. "Community contributions and local public goods." AEA RCT Registry. July 28. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11844-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

Sponsors

Partner

Name
NGO Forum for Public Health
Type
ngo
URL
https://www.ngof.org/
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Before our intervention, many households in the study communities were exposed to arsenic contamination in their drinking water, with potentially severe long-run health consequences. Arsenic occurs naturally in shallow groundwater in the region. The intervention we study comprises a package of technical advice and subsidies to build up to two community wells that draw arsenic-safe drinking water from deep underground.
Intervention Start Date
2015-10-15
Intervention End Date
2017-08-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
arsenic exposure index
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We randomly assigned 129 communities in equal proportions to receive this intervention under three different contribution rules: In the cash treatment arm, communities had to contribute approximately 10% of the cost of each well they wished to install, around US$72. In the labour treatment arm, communities had to contribute 18 person-days of manual labour for each well, valued at US$65 at the local unskilled daily wage rate. Communities assigned to a contribution waiver did not have to contribute towards wells they wished to install. The remaining 42 communities formed a pure control group that received no intervention.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
public lottery
Randomization Unit
community (geographically contiguous group of 50-250 households)
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
171 communities
Sample size: planned number of observations
6840 (baseline), additional populations targeted at follow-up
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
43 communities in each treatment arm, 42 communities in a pure control group
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
MDE of 0.08 standard deviations for impacts under each treatment arm based on analytical standard errors, 90% significance and 80% power
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethical & Independent Review
IRB Approval Date
2017-06-29
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
August 31, 2017, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
May 31, 2018, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
171 communities
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
6529 households (baseline); 7.948 households (endline)
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
43 communities in each treatment arm; 42 in pure control group
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
No
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Abstract

Community contribution requirements are a ubiquitous but understudied feature of projects to provide local public goods in developing countries. A randomized experiment in rural Bangladesh shows that cash contribution requirements strongly reduce take-up and impact of safe drinking water infrastructure projects, compared to a contribution waiver. Labour contribution requirements do not, despite having similar value if priced at the market wage, because most households value their time below the market wage and because labour contributions appear less costly to coordinate. Neither contribution requirement increases cost-effectiveness once we account for coordination and monitoring costs, undermining a central rationale for their imposition.
Citation
Cocciolo, S., Ghisolfi, S., Habib, Md. A., and Tompsett, A. (2023) Time Is Not Money: An Experiment With Community Contribution Requirements in Cash and Labour. Working Paper.
URL
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zkggJVORDiEZqaR8Qrxyn94WQz6_I8_q/view

Reports & Other Materials