Replication of “Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore” in America

Last registered on October 18, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Replication of “Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore” in America
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0014506
Initial registration date
October 07, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 18, 2024, 4:35 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-10-21
End date
2024-11-15
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study will be replicating “Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore” (Cameron et al., 2009) in America. The original study found support for the claim that the level of corruption of a country given by corruption indices is correlated with the willingness to engage and punish corrupt behavior of the country's citizens. So, this study will see if American citizens are more willing to engage or punish corrupt behavior and compare that to the country's corruption indices. Corruption will be modeled through a one-shot, sequential corruption game based on bribery taken from Cameron et al. (2009) where there are three players: a firm, a public official, and a citizen. The firm offers a bribe to the public official where they can accept or reject the bribe. If the bribe is rejected the game is over. But if the bribe is accepted, the citizen loses money and they will have the opportunity to punish the firm and the public official financially. We hypothesize that America will have a lower propensity to engage in corruption due to its good standing against corruption as shown in indices,
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Khan, Shayan and Jeffrey Michler. 2024. "Replication of “Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore” in America." AEA RCT Registry. October 18. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14506-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
There will be two possible treatments of either welfare-reducing or welfare-enhancing payoffs. Welfare-enhancing refers to the total payoff gains from bribery are greater than the total payoff loss. Welfare-reducing refers to the opposite of welfare-enhancing. The entire sample size will be split into these two treatments.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2024-10-21
Intervention End Date
2024-11-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
If participant offers a bribe, if participant accepts a bribe, if participant punishes bribery, if participant is an American citizen
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
These outcomes relate to if a participant engages in corruption or punishing it and if they are an American. These are of interest because we are trying to see how Americans engage in corrupt behavior and if that is related to the level of corruption of the country.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
The effect of welfare-reducing/enhancing treatment on willingness to engage and punish corruption
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
This is to see if payoffs affect how willing a participant would be willing to engage or punish corruption.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment design mirrors the study Cameron et al. (2009). In the lab experiment, there will be three players per group playing a one-shot sequential game that focuses on bribery, a common occurrence of corruption. These groups will be divided between welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing payoffs.The game starts with Player 1 who acts as a firm. They can choose to offer a bribe or not offer a bribe. If they choose to not offer a bribe, the game ends. If they choose to offer a bribe, they can pick the amount B ∈ [4, 8]. Once a bribe is offered, they will incur a cost of a transfer fee of 2. Next, Player 2 who acts as a public official can choose to accept or reject the bribe. If the bribe is accepted, the earnings of Players 1 and 2 will increase by 3B and the earnings of Player 3 will decrease by B. If the bribe is rejected, the game is instantly over. Finally, Player 3 who acts as a citizen can choose to punish or not punish Players 1
and 2. If they choose to punish, they can pick the punishment amount P ∈ [2, 12]. P will be deducted from the earnings of Player 3 and the amount 3P will be deducted from the earnings of Players 1 and 2. If Player 3 chooses to not punish the other players, the game
will be over.Once all the decisions have been made, the payoffs are calculated. If this group receives
welfare-enhancing payoffs, the payoffs are the following: •Firm: 3B − 2 − 3P • Public Official: 3B − 3P • Citizen: −B − P
If this group receives welfare-reducing payoffs, the payoffs are the following: • Firm: 3B − 2 − 3P • Public Official: 3B − 3P • Citizen: −7B − P
We conduct the experiment in the Economic Science Laboratory (ESL) at the University of Arizona. Participants will be recruited through email and will consist of undergraduate students. We expect to have 21 or 30 participants per session. Since three participants are required per game, we will ensure that the number of participants per session is a multiple of three. After reading and signing the consent form, the participants will receive the instructions of the experiment both written and verbally. Then, they will fill out a demographic survey on their computer that asks the following: if they have participated in an ESL experiment before, class standing, age, gender, and nationality. Once the survey is completed, groups will be randomly assigned either welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing payoffs. After the treatment, the aforementioned bribery game will be played. The participants will be made aware of their payoffs, the effects of their decision, and the payoffs of others. Once the game is completed, the participants will fill out a survey asking the motives behind their decisions in the game. After this survey is completed, participants can collect their earnings from the game.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization is done by the website in which the game is played
Randomization Unit
Individuals will be randomized into groups of 3 to play the game. Each group is randomized to either receive welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing payments.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
34 groups
Sample size: planned number of observations
102 participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
17 welfare-enhancing groups, 17 welfare-reducing groups
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

Documents

Document Name
Instructions given to Particpants
Document Type
other
Document Description
This document provides the instructions that will be read and given out to the participants of this study.
File
Instructions given to Particpants

MD5: 7b3f1745436aa94b33fb3d7d0b05148c

SHA1: b5bf655ec76bb3d6684b2c1139fa37a4d655cc75

Uploaded At: October 01, 2024

Document Name
IRB Protocol
Document Type
irb_protocol
Document Description
This is the IRB protocol submitted to the University of Arizona Institutional Review Board
File
IRB Protocol

MD5: ce6518c6e9cd773fbf65bbff25de799a

SHA1: bf73660c671bbb2122b116ce78e35148864b6b5d

Uploaded At: October 01, 2024

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Arizona Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2024-09-23
IRB Approval Number
N/A

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials