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Testing Legislator Responsiveness to Citizens and Firms in the Vietnamese National Assembly: A Field Experiment

Last registered on November 28, 2016

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Testing Legislator Responsiveness to Citizens and Firms in the Vietnamese National Assembly: A Field Experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0001608
Initial registration date
September 22, 2016

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
September 22, 2016, 1:12 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
November 28, 2016, 11:19 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Duke University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Indiana University - Bloomington, School of Public and Environmental Affairs
PI Affiliation
Duke University
PI Affiliation
Duke University

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2016-10-01
End date
2017-12-01
Secondary IDs
Abstract
A legislature capable of making laws broadly reflective of societal interests is a cornerstone for both development and democracy. Recognizing this fact, development agencies have invested millions in legislative strengthening initiatives around the developing world to develop legislative research capacities and provide legislators with information crucial to decision-making. At the same time, authoritarian regimes around the globe have adopted or revived institutions traditionally associated with democracy, primary among them the elected legislature. What remains unclear, however, is whether legislative strengthening initiatives in the authoritarian context induce greater responsiveness to societal interests, as intended. When properly informed of constituent preferences, to whom are authoritarian legislators more responsive - the citizenry, local firms, or the ruling party? Utilizing a randomized control trial (RCT), we assign delegates of the Vietnamese National Assembly (VNA) to one of three groups: (1) those briefed on the opinions of citizens within their province; (2) those presented with the preferences of local firms; and (3) those receiving summary statistics of recent statements by the Communist Party of Vietnam - each treatment tailored to the same upcoming legislative debate. Following an initial survey to gauge delegates' informational deficit, informational treatments in the form of infographics will be distributed. After a brief survey of delegates' legislative priorities, the final set of outcomes will be culled from publicly available transcripts of the legislative floor debate. Responsiveness will be measured by requests for additional information, legislative priorities and the reasoning behind them, and speech patterns on the floor of the VNA.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Le, Anh et al. 2016. "Testing Legislator Responsiveness to Citizens and Firms in the Vietnamese National Assembly: A Field Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. November 28. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1608-2.0
Former Citation
Le, Anh et al. 2016. "Testing Legislator Responsiveness to Citizens and Firms in the Vietnamese National Assembly: A Field Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. November 28. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1608/history/12095
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2017-04-01
Intervention End Date
2017-06-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
(1) The informational deficit faced by delegates will be measured by whether they request targeted constituent preferences.
(2) Legislator responsiveness will be measured by (a) whether delegates request additional information on constituent preferences, (b) whether delegates highlight the targeted bill as their legislative priority in open-ended questioning prior to the legislative session, (c) whether delegates explain these priorities by citing the treatment or targeted constituency, and (d) provincial-level counts of mentions of the treatment or targeted constituency in floor debates.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We randomly assign VNA delegates to one of three informational treatments tailored to an upcoming legislative debate: (1) the preferences of the provincial citizenry; (2) the preferences of local firms; or (3) recent statements by the Communist Party of Vietnam. Randomization is stratified at the provincial level by logged GDP per capita, logged fiscal transfers from the central government, logged delegation size, and an indicator for former provinces of the Republic of Vietnam. Randomization is further stratified at the individual level by indicators for central (vs. local) nomination status, full-time (vs. part-time) status, and competitive elections (operationalized as vote shares below the median of those elected).

We first survey delegates by phone to gauge the informational deficit they face, informing each that the preferences of [his/her randomly assigned] constituency with regard to the upcoming bill have been curated as a briefing, and asking if s/he would like to receive the briefing. We then distribute informational treatments in the form of infographics, each containing contact details for more information. Infographics are delivered according to random assignment via postal mail, email, and an online application proprietary to the VNA. Approximately two weeks after treatment delivery, we mail delegates a brief survey to ascertain their legislative priorities, asking what is the most important bill of the upcoming session and why. Finally, the texts of delegates' floor speeches are obtained from the VNA's publicly available website, and delegate speech patterns are analyzed for references to the informational treatments or targeted constituencies.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization is conducted by an R script run at the investigators' home institution.
Randomization Unit
Randomization is conducted at the individual level, with stratification variables at both provincial and individual levels.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
0 clusters
Sample size: planned number of observations
477 delegates
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
159 citizen preferences, 159 firm preferences, 159 Party statements
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Duke University Institutional Review Board for Non-Medical Research
IRB Approval Date
2016-05-31
IRB Approval Number
D0671

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials