Abstract
This study evaluates a new approach to community-based forest management, “Competition for Ecosystem Services” (CES), which introduces competitive incentives into a traditional Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) framework. CES creates an internal competitive structure among participating communities, rewarding those that demonstrate relatively greater conservation achievements. We implement a randomized controlled experiment with 60 Village Common Forests (VCFs) in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, randomly assigned to CES, PES, or a control group. Forest carbon stocks are measured before and after the intervention using drone-based multispectral imagery, calibrated with ground-plot biomass data. Carbon conservation serves as the primary outcome and is estimated at the 30 m × 30 m cell level using an ANCOVA specification. Secondary outcomes—including labor contributions to forest management and in-group/out-group social preferences measured through behavioral games—are analyzed with individual-level. The study focuses on two core questions: whether competitive incentives lead to greater conservation gains than PES and how such incentives shape social relationships within communities.