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Why do firms hire migrant workers?

Last registered on January 12, 2026
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Why do firms hire migrant workers?
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0017613
Initial registration date
January 10, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 12, 2026, 8:17 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
India
Region
Bihar

Primary Investigator

Name
Varun K
Affiliation
Harvard University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Chinmaya Kumar
PI Affiliation
Azim Premji University
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-01-12
End date
2027-05-19
Keywords
Behavior, Firms & Productivity, Labor
Additional Keywords
incomplete markets, migration, absenteeism, working conditions, informal labor markets
JEL code(s)
O12, O17, D86, D83, D22, D52, J22, J23, J41, J46, J47, J63, J64, J83
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Millions of workers migrate for work across the globe. In LMICs, where many local labor markets witness high levels of unemployment, internal migration for work is prevalent. Standard economic theory argues that this is driven by reservation wage differences of migrant and local workers. This paper will try to understand a) whether firms prefer migrant workers compared to local workers at the same wage b) the drivers of these preferences.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
K, Varun and Chinmaya Kumar. 2026. "Why do firms hire migrant workers?." AEA RCT Registry. January 12. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17613-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The primary goal of the project is to understand the drivers of firms' preference for migrant workers.
Intervention Start Date
2026-01-12
Intervention End Date
2027-05-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

1) Acceptance of contracts on the firm side
2) Job acceptance on the worker side
3) Productivity of workers (no of hours worked, absenteeism) when they are matched with firms.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Beliefs of firms about productivity and social vulnerability of local and migrant workers.
Beliefs of workers about productivity and social vulnerability for local and migrant workers.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Worker side: A Unique ID with treatment cells randomly allocated to them is created in the office. Enumerators recruit the workers in the order of unique id.
Firm side: The contract choice for firms will be randomly chosen in the office through a computer.
Randomization Unit
Randomization on the worker is done at the individual level.
Workers and firms which accept contracts within a treatment cell are matched with each other randomly to each other.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
We will cluster at the individual level for the firms as we observe them hiring more than one workers, and because we offer them more than one contracts to hire workers on.
Sample size: planned number of observations
Our firm side sample will consist of 800 firms. 2000 workers, including local (800) and migrant (1200) workers. There is a possibility that we might not be able to reach 2000 workers. Similarly, number of firms may be below 800.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

On the worker side for migrants:
Pure control 10%, Control off site (22.5%), Control On site (22.5%), Outside option On site (11.25%), Outside option off site (11.25%),
Monitoring On site (11.25%), Monitoring off site (11.25%)

On the worker side for local:
Control off site (50%), Outside option off site (25%), Monitoring off site (25%)



Firms:

Each firm will be offered all the different contracts, one of which will be randomly chosen and implemented.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Harvard University
IRB Approval Date
2025-12-05
IRB Approval Number
IRB25-1242
IRB Name
Azim Premji University
IRB Approval Date
2025-10-21
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan