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Why do firms hire migrant workers?

Last registered on January 17, 2026

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Why do firms hire migrant workers?

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0017613

Initial registration date

January 10, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

January 12, 2026, 8:17 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated

January 17, 2026, 6:22 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Affiliation

Harvard University

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

PI Affiliation

Azim Premji University

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2026-01-12

End date

2027-05-19

Keywords

Behavior, Firms & Productivity, Labor

Additional Keywords

incomplete markets, migration, absenteeism, working conditions, informal labor markets

JEL code(s)

O12, O17, D86, D83, D22, D52, J22, J23, J41, J46, J47, J63, J64, J83

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

Millions of workers migrate for work across the globe. In LMICs, where many local labor markets witness high levels of unemployment, internal migration for work is prevalent. Standard economic theory argues that this is driven by reservation wage differences of migrant and local workers. This paper will try to understand a) whether firms prefer migrant workers compared to local workers at the same wage b) the drivers of these preferences.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

K, Varun and Chinmaya Kumar. 2026. "Why do firms hire migrant workers?." AEA RCT Registry. January 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17613-1.2

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

The primary goal of the project is to understand the drivers of firms' preference for migrant workers.

Intervention Start Date

2026-01-12

Intervention End Date

2027-05-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

1) Acceptance of contracts (at different wages) on the firm side. This will give us WTP as well.
2) Job acceptance (and the associated wages) on the worker side.
3) WTP to pay for different contract features on worker side.
4) Productivity of workers (no of hours worked, absenteeism) when they are matched with firms.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

We will be looking at heterogeneity in preference for local and migrant workers by firm size and previous experience of working with migrants. Firm size variable would be created using a combination of i) number of construction sites that the firm is operating ii) number of workers employed.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Beliefs of firms about productivity and social vulnerability of local and migrant workers.
Beliefs of workers about productivity and social vulnerability for local and migrant workers.
Preference ordering of firms for the different menu of contracts.

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design

.

Experimental Design Details

Not available

Randomization Method

Worker side: A Unique ID with treatment cells randomly allocated to them is created in the office. Enumerators recruit the workers in the order of unique id.
Firm side: The contract choice for firms will be randomly chosen in the office through a computer.

Randomization Unit

Randomization on the worker is done at the individual level.
Workers and firms which accept contracts within a treatment cell are matched with each other randomly to each other.

Was the treatment clustered?

No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

We will cluster at the individual level for the firms as we observe them hiring more than one workers, and because we offer them more than one contracts to hire workers on.

Sample size: planned number of observations

Our firm side sample will consist of 800 firms. 2000 workers, including local (800) and migrant (1200) workers. There is a possibility that we might not be able to reach 2000 workers. Similarly, number of firms may be below 800.

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

On the worker side for migrants: Each worker (except pure control) will be offered two jobs one of which will always be Baseline Control.

Pure control 10%, Control off site (45%), Control On site (45%), Outside option On site (15%), Outside option off site (15%),
Monitoring On site (15%), Monitoring off site (15%), Insurance On site (15%), Insurance off site (15%)

On the worker side for local:
Control off site (50%), Outside option off site (25%), Monitoring off site (25%)

Firms:

Each firm will be offered all the different contracts, one of which will be randomly chosen and implemented.

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name

Harvard University

IRB Approval Date

2025-12-05

IRB Approval Number

IRB25-1242

IRB Name

Azim Premji University

IRB Approval Date

2025-10-21

IRB Approval Number

N/A