The Salience of Rights and Duties in Integration Agreements: Evidence from Jobseekers in France

The intervention consists of informational emails sent to newly registered job seekers who have signed a Contrat d'Engagement (CE) with their caseworker at France Travail. The CE is an integration agreement specifying a personalized action plan, the reciprocal commitments of the job seeker and the caseworker, and the conditions under which compliance is monitored and sanctioned.
Depending on treatment assignment, job seekers in the treated groups receive one of two emails approximately three weeks after they sign the CE. The first email reminds job seekers of their commitments under the CE, the monitoring procedures used by France Travail, and the sanctions that may apply in case of non-compliance. The second email reminds job seekers of the commitments of France Travail and their caseworker under the CE, of their rights as job seekers registered, and of the services available to them.
Jobseekers in the control group receive no email.

2026-06-01

2027-01-31

(1) Leaving unemployment for work
(2) Employment rates
(3) Number of job applications

We use administrative records from France Travail that can be matched with administrative data on employment outcomes. These data allow us to observe, for each individual in our sample, whether they are registered at France Travail, whether they receive unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, and their employment status for up to 18 months after leaving unemployment. Using these administrative records, we will estimate (1) the probability of exiting unemployment for work before unemployment duration t, and (2) the probability of being employed at time t since signing the first integration agreement after registration at France Travail.

The administrative records from France Travail also contain information on job search behavior on the France Travail platform. Our first measure of the number of job applications submitted by the job seeker will be based on the applications sent through the France Travail platform. A second measure will be based on the surveys conducted among job seekers. In these surveys, respondents report the total number of applications sent to employers during the previous four weeks. They are also asked about the number of applications submitted through different channels, including through France Travail.

We will investigate treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to the predicted reemployment rates for the individuals in our sample. The prediction model will be based on a large set of characteristics observed in the administrative data of France Travail, including socio-demographic characteristics (such as education, age and gender), previous employment history, participation in active labor market policy programs, potential benefit duration and UI benefit amounts, and indicators of local labor market conditions. Another dimension of heterogeneity we will examine is job seekers’ locus of control. In the first job seekers survey, conducted around one month after signing the integration agreement, we measure locus of control using a battery of standard questions. We plan to conduct around 30,000 interviews in the first survey wave.

We will also explore effect heterogeneity depending on local labor market conditions, the caseworker types and activities, and individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, and eligibility for UI benefits.

We will additionally estimate the interaction between treatment assignment in this trial and the treatment arm to which a jobseeker's agency was assigned in AEARCTR-0017471, for both primary and secondary outcomes. AEARCTR-0017471 (Breda et al., 2026), is a companion experiment in which the randomization is at the agency level and in which treatment assignment is orthogonal to the one in the experiment currently described.

(1) Reservation Wage
(2) Search Effort (time)
(3) Earnings
(4) Type of employment contract
(5) Sectoral and occupational mobility
(6) Perceived understanding of obligations and sanctions
(7) Subjective probability of being monitored and sanctioned
(8) Perceived caseworker engagement and trust

In both job seeker surveys, respondents report their reservation wage and the time they spent on job search during the previous week. Perceived understanding of obligations and sanctions is measured in the first job seeker survey: job seekers report whether the engagement contract made their obligations and the applicable sanctions clearer, and whether their caseworker discussed those sanctions with them. Subjective probability of being monitored and sanctioned is measured in the first job seeker survey using questions about perceived monitoring and sanction risks. Perceived caseworker engagement and trust is measured in the first job seeker survey using questions on trust in the caseworker, the perceived adequacy of the support, and overall satisfaction.
The administrative data contain information on realized labor market outcomes, including earnings, the type of employment contract individuals enter (permanent or temporary), and whether job seekers transition to jobs in different sectors or occupations relative to previous employment. We observe industry and occupation codes for both previous jobs and newly accepted jobs, which allows us to identify actual sectoral and occupational transitions. In addition, we observe the occupations associated with the vacancies to which job seekers apply. This information allows us to examine the extent to which job seekers apply to positions in occupations that differ from their previous employment.
In addition to the primary and secondary outcomes, we will explore several additional dimensions related to job search behavior and labor market outcomes. These include measures of job search activity and strategies, such as the number of interviews, clicks on job postings, the use of formal versus informal search channels, the willingness to make concessions on job characteristics, and the evolution of the average wage associated with the vacancies to which job seekers apply on the France Travail platform. We will further examine perceived job finding prospects, and stress experienced during the search process. Additional exploratory outcomes relate to the subjective evaluation of the integration agreement and counseling process. Further, we will explore outcomes related to job quality and employment trajectories, such as wages at re-employment, job satisfaction, duration of employment spells, and employer quality.

The experiment is implemented through emails sent to newly registered jobseekers shortly after they sign a Contrat d'Engagement (CE) with their caseworker at France Travail and based on randomization at the individual level. Each week, we sample the inflow of signatories who meet the inclusion criteria and randomly assign them — with equal probability — to one of three groups.
Treatment Arm 1 (T1): Around three weeks after the signature, job seekers receive an email reminding them of their obligations, the monitoring system, and potential sanctions in case of non-compliance.
Treatment Arm 2 (T2): Around three weeks after the signature, job seekers receive an email emphasizing the commitments of France Travail and their caseworker, the services available to them, and their rights as job seekers.
Control group: this group does not receive an email.
This design allows us to separately estimate the causal effects of the two treatments.
Our sample consists of jobseekers who had no previous contact with France Travail in the six months before their current registration, and who sign a CE in the first four months after their registration. The overall inflow sample consists of weekly cohorts of newly registered jobseekers entering the sample between June 2026 and December 2026.
During the same period, the agency-level randomization registered as AEARCTR-0017471 (Breda et al., 2026) assigns each France Travail agency to one of four arms (target setting, monitoring transparency, combined, control). The two trials are conducted simultaneously and independently, so each individual in the present trial belongs to an agency assigned to one of these four arms. We exploit this cross-randomization in our analyses.
During the experiment, approximately 25,000 job seekers are sampled per week, randomly split in equal proportion across the three experimental arms — yielding approximately 16,700 jobseekers who receive an email each week. We conduct two post-treatment surveys among the sampled population. The first survey is fielded approximately one month after CE signature and the second approximately six months after CE signature. For each survey wave, we target a sample size of around 30,000 completed interviews.

Not available

Randomization is performed independently across weekly cohorts, using standard statistical software (R).

Individual

No

The trial is not clustered.

Approximately 700,000 jobseekers over the experimental intake period (June – December 2026).

Approximately 233,000 individuals in T1 (email reminding of duties and sanctions), 233,000 in T2 (email emphasizing caseworker engagement and rights), and 233,000 in the control group.

For the power calculation, we assume an inflow sample of 700,000 unemployed job seekers for whom outcomes can be measured using administrative data. In addition, we will conduct two surveys among job seekers and target 30,000 interviews for each wave. We calculate minimum detectable effect (MDE) sizes for comparisons between each treatment arm and the control group. We get a MDE of 0.4 percentage points for the employment rate, which corresponds to a relative effect of 1% (assuming an average employment rate of 40% 6 months after unemployment entry). For the number of applications sent – observed in the surveys — we get a MDE of 0.71, which corresponds to a relative effect of 6.8% (assuming an average number of applications in the last four weeks of 10.5 and a standard deviation of 18).