The Price of Obsolescence

Last registered on August 31, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The Price of Obsolescence
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0019540
Initial registration date
August 29, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 31, 2026, 8:51 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Harvard University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
MIT

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-09-01
End date
2027-12-01
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Progress in enabling machines to perform an expanding range of manual tasks depends on task-level data that encode how those tasks are carried out. Generating these data requires workers to record their actions as they perform their jobs. Workers thus supply a key input into the creation of labor-substituting capital, potentially facilitating their own displacement and shaping how the gains from automation are divided between labor and capital. We study how workers make this decision, and whether it is shaped by information asymmetry over the downstream use of their data and by weak worker bargaining power. In a survey experiment with factory workers in Delhi NCR, India, drawn from textiles, electronics, and other manufacturing, we elicit the minimum additional daily payment workers require to make first-person recordings of their work, cross-randomizing whether workers are informed that the resulting footage will be used to train a machine that could replace them. Each worker prices two counterparties in randomized order, their own employer and an outside research organisation, which identifies what the employment relationship does to the price of consent.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Chhina, Raman and Varun K. 2026. "The Price of Obsolescence." AEA RCT Registry. August 31. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19540-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The workers in the experiment will receive hypothetical offers to wear a head-mounted camera which will record how they perform their usual work.
Intervention Start Date
2026-09-01
Intervention End Date
2027-11-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
1. Willingness to record in INR per day for control and disclosure arms.
2. overhead-camera WTA in INR per day
3. Difference in WTA across counterparties
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
1) Stated reasons for recording free and for refusing at any price
2) The collectively bargained WTA relative to the individual WTA
3) perceived ability to refuse each counterparty;
4) perceived pivotality (whether another worker would record instead)
5) beliefs about automation of the respondent’s job within 2 and 5 years
6) beliefs about other workers’ demands
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The workers in the experiment will receive hypothetical offers to wear a head-mounted camera which will record how they perform their usual work. The design will vary the downstream usage of the data, the length of recording at the individual level, and the nature of the party making the offer at within-worker level.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
By computer, stratified by industry within treatment cell. The counterparty order is balanced within treatment-by-industry strata. The running order of interviews proceeds industry by industry and is randomized within each industry block.
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
NA
Sample size: planned number of observations
600-700
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
90% of sample is equally divided among the 4 cells and the remaining 10% goes to the 5th cell.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Harvard University
IRB Approval Date
2026-08-27
IRB Approval Number
IRB26-0756