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Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?

Last registered on April 25, 2017

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002166
Initial registration date
April 20, 2017

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 20, 2017, 10:47 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
April 25, 2017, 3:17 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Google Deep Mind

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Stockholm School of Economics

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2017-04-20
End date
2017-04-28
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In the experiment participants will be able to collect money to The Red Cross in a real effort task resembling the task used by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009). We introduce two different treatments in which we vary the mechanism with which information about donations and the person donating is made public. In both treatments only the 10 participants with a highest donations are announced to everyone by name. Whereas this disclosure of participants' names is automatic in the first treatment, this is subject to choice in the second. We hypothesize firstly, that a significant share of participants in the second treatment will choose to not disclose their name, thereby forego the opportunity to gather social esteem. Secondly, that this behavior by some subjects devalues the opportunity to gather social esteem and hence will lead to lower effort to donate in the second treatment as compared to the first.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Born, Andreas and Christian Jacobsson. 2017. "Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?." AEA RCT Registry. April 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2166-2.0
Former Citation
Born, Andreas and Christian Jacobsson. 2017. "Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?." AEA RCT Registry. April 25. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2166/history/16859
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention (Hidden)
In the proposed study participants may choose to do a repetitive task (pressing buttons) for a maximum of 5 minutes to donate money to the Red Cross in a laboratory experiment. The more buttons a participant presses, the higher the donation. In the baseline treatment, the 10 participants with the highest donations in the room are recognized for their donations by being called out by name to stand up to be recognized by the group. In a second treatment participants can choose whether they want to be recognized as described above or stay anonymous if their donation is among the 10 highest. In the latter case only the donated amount itself is announced. We hypothesize firstly, that a significant share of participants in treatment 2 will choose not to stand up, thereby foregoing, at first glance, a seemingly cheap opportunity to gain social esteem. Secondly, we expect that participants in treatment 1 press more buttons than in treatment 2, thereby donating a higher sum on average. Thirdly, we predict that a person who made one of the 10 highest is seen as less socially desirable when the person actively chose to reveal his/her name as compared to when the she either could not choose or did not choose to do so.
Intervention Start Date
2017-04-20
Intervention End Date
2017-04-28

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Number of buttons clicked; Choice whether to reveal name; survey question about difference in donation-effort if choice/no choice; evaluation of social appropriateness of 3 different behaviors (from the post-survey)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
In the experiment participants will be able to collect money to The Red Cross in a real effort task resembling the task used by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009). We introduce two different treatments in which we vary the mechanism with which information about donations and the person donating is made public. In both treatments only the 10 participants with a highest donations are announced to everyone by name together with the amount of their donation. Whereas this disclosure of participants' names is automatic in the first treatment, this is subject to choice in the second.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Subjects draw a seat card from a stack of mixed cards. The card assigns them to a particular spot in one of two rooms (one for each treatment). So both, assignment to the room (=treatment) as well as assignment to a particular seat, is random.
Randomization Unit
individual participant
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1
Sample size: planned number of observations
200-240 students participating in the experiment
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
100-120 participants in each of the two treatments.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials