Voter Pessimism and Electoral Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Kenya

Last registered on May 21, 2013

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Can Voters Reward Prudent Managers of Public Funds in Kenya?

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0000005

First published

May 21, 2013, 5:43 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated

May 21, 2013, 5:53 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country

Kenya

Region

National

Primary Investigator

Name

Kelly Zhang

Affiliation

MIT GOV/LAB

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status

On going

Start date

2013-01-26

End date

2014-05-31

Keywords

Electoral

Additional Keywords

public goods, corruption, audits, voting, accountability, information

JEL code(s)

Secondary IDs

Abstract

When the political class is widely perceived to be corrupt, can citizens distinguish between the politicians who are prudent managers of public funds from the politicians who mismanage funds? This approach takes a different approach to most anti-corruption information campaigns, in positing that citizens may assume that their leaders are stealing public funds, even when they are not. A field experiment during the 2013 Kenyan national elections identifies if information about politician management of public funds can improve support for prudent fiscal managers, as well as reducing support for poorly performing ones. Moreover, it compares citizen perceptions of politician performance to audit data on politician performance in managing public funds, and examines the extent to which individuals can recall political and non-political information during elections.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Zhang, Kelly. 2013. "Can Voters Reward Prudent Managers of Public Funds in Kenya?." AEA RCT Registry. May 21. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5-3.0

Former Citation

Zhang, Kelly. 2013. "Can Voters Reward Prudent Managers of Public Funds in Kenya?." AEA RCT Registry. May 21. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5/history/55

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

The intervention was embedded within a series of factual SMS messages. Information on how much money was allocated to the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and how much money actually reached projects was provided to constituents. The intervention used audit data from the National Taxpayer's Association Citizen Report Cards.

Intervention Start Date

2013-03-02

Intervention End Date

2013-03-07

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Information uptake, political support, beliefs about incumbent quality

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

See pre-analysis plan.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Treatment was randomly assigned at the individual level, in a nationwide sample.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Randomization done using Stata.

Randomization Unit

Individual

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

N/A

Sample size: planned number of observations

2500 individuals/1600 individuals

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

N/A

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

MDE=0.05%, sd=28.8667, power=0.80, alpha=0.05

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name

Stanford IRB

IRB Approval Date

2012-12-21

IRB Approval Number

26335

Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal