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Morality-Efficiency Tradeoffs: An Experimental Study

Last registered on June 13, 2015
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Morality-Efficiency Tradeoffs: An Experimental Study
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0000732
Initial registration date
June 13, 2015

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 13, 2015, 5:35 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region
NY
Country
United States of America
Region
NY
Country
United States of America
Region
NY

Primary Investigator

Name
Mario Macis
Affiliation
Johns Hopkins University
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Nicola Lacetera
PI Affiliation
University of Toronto
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Julio J. Elias
PI Affiliation
Universidad del CEMA
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2015-08-03
End date
2016-12-31
Keywords
Health
Additional Keywords
Ethics, Repugnant Transactions, Preferences
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In modern societies, certain of activities and transactions are limited or prohibited on the basis of ethical considerations, even when the parties in these activities or transactions may benefit from an economic standpoint. Examples include payments for human organs for transplantation, prostitution, the performance of morally controversial research, and the commercialization of living organisms. The opposition to these activities rests in part on a desire to protect vulnerable people from exploitation or coercion. However, the aversion is often due to the idea that certain transactions would corrupt moral values. In this study, we propose and test a methodology to understand individuals’ attitudes toward ethically controversial transactions. Specifically, the goal of this study is to determine whether and how individuals make trade-offs between moral values and economic efficiency, and to estimate these preferences and their distribution in the population.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Elias, Julio J., Nicola Lacetera and Mario Macis. 2015. "Morality-Efficiency Tradeoffs: An Experimental Study." AEA RCT Registry. June 13. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.732-1.0
Former Citation
Elias, Julio J., Nicola Lacetera and Mario Macis. 2015. "Morality-Efficiency Tradeoffs: An Experimental Study." AEA RCT Registry. June 13. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/732/history/4437
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
To quantify the trade-offs between morality and economic efficiency, we will perform experimental survey studies with approximately 5,000 subjects recruited online and through professional survey firms. For a series of morally controversial transactions, we will present respondents with a set of alternative systems, randomly varying (a) whether some form of compensation to the "sellers" is allowed (e.g., monetary or in-kind payments to kidney donors), (b) whether allocation of the scarce resource (e.g., kidneys for transplantation) is based on market forces or decided by a government agency, and (c) the (estimated) gains for society associated with the various systems. We will then gauge the respondents' degree of moral concern and overall favor for the various systems. Then, we will obtain estimates, at the individual level, of marginal rates of substitution between "morality" and "efficiency".
Intervention Start Date
2015-08-03
Intervention End Date
2016-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The key outcome variables are:
(1) Degree of favor for alternative regulatory regimes for morally controversial transactions (e.g., procurement and allocation of organs for transplantation).
(2) Degree of moral concern associated with alternative regulatory regimes (e.g., concern for exploitation of the poor and vulnerable, coercion, respect for human dignity).
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Randomized controlled trial.
Experimental Design Details
CASE 1: PAYMENTS FOR HUMAN ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION

About 5,000 respondents will be recruited online and through professional survey firms.

Each subject will be presented with three (3) possible systems of procurement and allocation of organs among the following eleven (11) systems (more details are provided in the Docs & Materials)

System A: unpaid donors, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc. Efficiency = 20% of demand satisfied.
System B1: $20,000 cash paid to donors, individual purchases or organs, market-based allocation of organs; Efficiency = 80% of demand satisfied
System B2: $20,000 cash paid to donors, individual purchases or organs, market-based allocation of organs; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System C1: $20,000 cash paid to donors, government agency, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 80% of demand satisfied
System C2: $20,000 cash paid to donors, government agency, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System D1: donors' expenses reimbursed, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 80% of demand satisfied
System D2: donors' expenses reimbursed, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System E1: donor given $20,000 in-kind (e.g. housing subsidy), government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 80% of demand satisfied
System E1: donor given $20,000 in-kind (e.g. housing subsidy), government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System F: unpaid donors, opt-out ("presumed consent") system for donor registry managed by a government agency; allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System G: unpaid donors, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on urgency, waiting time, etc. + priority list for registered donors; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied

Subjects will be randomly assigned to one of the following TEN experimental conditions:

Group 1: Systems A, B, C. No efficiency mentioned; Systems ratings elicited first; Morality elicited next.
Group 2: Systems A, B, C. No efficiency mentioned; Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
(Comparison of 1 and 2 will let us know whether the overall rating of the systems is affected by whether the subjects have been asked to think about morality first)

Group 3: Systems A, Bh, Ch. Efficiency mentioned (high); Systems ratings elicited first; Morality elicited next
Group 4: Systems A, Bh, Ch. Efficiency mentioned (high); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.

(Comparison of 1 and 3 and of 2 and 4 will let us know whether the morality judgments are affected by the efficiency of the systems or whether they are independent of outcomes)

Group 5: Systems A, Bl, Cl. Efficiency mentioned (low); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
(Comparison of 4 and 5 will further inform us of whether the morality judgments are affected by the efficiency of the systems or whether they are independent of outcomes)

Group 6: Systems A, Dh, Eh. Efficiency mentioned (high); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
Group 7: Systems A, Dl, El. Efficiency mentioned (low); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
Group 8: Systems Ch, Dh, Eh. Efficiency mentioned (high); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
Group 9: Systems Cl, Dl, El. Efficiency mentioned (low); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
(Results from groups 6, 7, 8 and 9 will tell us whether the morality judgments differ depending on whether organ donors are offered cash, expenses reimbursement, or in-kind payments)

Group 10: Systems A, F, G. Efficiency mentioned; Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
(results from group 10 will inform us of how morality judgments of systems based on "presumed consent" and giving priority to persons on the registry compare to systems where donors are compensated/reimbursed for expenses)
Randomization Method
Randomization done by survey software (Qualtrics).
Randomization Unit
Individual randomization.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
5000
Sample size: planned number of observations
5000 respondents
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
10 experimental conditions, 500 subjects per condition
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Toronto Research Ethics Board
IRB Approval Date
2015-05-14
IRB Approval Number
30238
IRB Name
The Johns Hopkins Homewood Institutional Review Board (HIRB)
IRB Approval Date
2015-06-03
IRB Approval Number
HIRB00001991
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials