Experimental Design Details
CASE 1: PAYMENTS FOR HUMAN ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION
About 5,000 respondents will be recruited online and through professional survey firms.
Each subject will be presented with three (3) possible systems of procurement and allocation of organs among the following eleven (11) systems (more details are provided in the Docs & Materials)
System A: unpaid donors, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc. Efficiency = 20% of demand satisfied.
System B1: $20,000 cash paid to donors, individual purchases or organs, market-based allocation of organs; Efficiency = 80% of demand satisfied
System B2: $20,000 cash paid to donors, individual purchases or organs, market-based allocation of organs; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System C1: $20,000 cash paid to donors, government agency, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 80% of demand satisfied
System C2: $20,000 cash paid to donors, government agency, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System D1: donors' expenses reimbursed, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 80% of demand satisfied
System D2: donors' expenses reimbursed, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System E1: donor given $20,000 in-kind (e.g. housing subsidy), government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 80% of demand satisfied
System E1: donor given $20,000 in-kind (e.g. housing subsidy), government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System F: unpaid donors, opt-out ("presumed consent") system for donor registry managed by a government agency; allocation of organs based on priority rules based on urgency, waiting time, etc.; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
System G: unpaid donors, government agency recruits donors, allocation of organs based on urgency, waiting time, etc. + priority list for registered donors; Efficiency = 40% of demand satisfied
Subjects will be randomly assigned to one of the following TEN experimental conditions:
Group 1: Systems A, B, C. No efficiency mentioned; Systems ratings elicited first; Morality elicited next.
Group 2: Systems A, B, C. No efficiency mentioned; Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
(Comparison of 1 and 2 will let us know whether the overall rating of the systems is affected by whether the subjects have been asked to think about morality first)
Group 3: Systems A, Bh, Ch. Efficiency mentioned (high); Systems ratings elicited first; Morality elicited next
Group 4: Systems A, Bh, Ch. Efficiency mentioned (high); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
(Comparison of 1 and 3 and of 2 and 4 will let us know whether the morality judgments are affected by the efficiency of the systems or whether they are independent of outcomes)
Group 5: Systems A, Bl, Cl. Efficiency mentioned (low); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
(Comparison of 4 and 5 will further inform us of whether the morality judgments are affected by the efficiency of the systems or whether they are independent of outcomes)
Group 6: Systems A, Dh, Eh. Efficiency mentioned (high); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
Group 7: Systems A, Dl, El. Efficiency mentioned (low); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
Group 8: Systems Ch, Dh, Eh. Efficiency mentioned (high); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
Group 9: Systems Cl, Dl, El. Efficiency mentioned (low); Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
(Results from groups 6, 7, 8 and 9 will tell us whether the morality judgments differ depending on whether organ donors are offered cash, expenses reimbursement, or in-kind payments)
Group 10: Systems A, F, G. Efficiency mentioned; Morality ratings elicited first; Systems ratings elicited next.
(results from group 10 will inform us of how morality judgments of systems based on "presumed consent" and giving priority to persons on the registry compare to systems where donors are compensated/reimbursed for expenses)