Rule enforcement and trust of fresh food vendors

Last registered on September 20, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Rule enforcement and trust of fresh food vendors
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0008245
Initial registration date
September 19, 2021
Last updated
September 20, 2021, 6:06 PM EDT

Locations

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Ecuador

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Escuela Politécnica del Litoral
PI Affiliation
Inter-American Development Bank

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2021-09-20
End date
2021-10-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We analyze rule enforcement in a setting of approximately 1200 vendors in 22 traditional fresh food markets in Quito, Ecuador. Markets' operations depend on vendors' payments for collective goods such as water supply, electricity, cleaning, and security guard services. However, the payments go through a complex administrative process and depend on vendors' trust and their rule enforcement preferences. Vendors associations' representatives and municipal agents are in charge of enforcement. The project aims to measure whether providing information about the default rate and the payment process has effects on vendors' preferences on rule enforcement.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Granda, Francisca, Philip Keefer and Gonzalo Sanchez. 2021. "Rule enforcement and trust of fresh food vendors." AEA RCT Registry. September 20. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8245-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention Start Date
2021-09-20
Intervention End Date
2021-09-21

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
We want to respond to three questions:
1. What is the effect of information on the average default rates on the four reform preferences?
2. What is the effect of information about the payment process on the four reform preferences?
3. How do these preferences change regarding trust among vendors and on vendors associations' representatives and municipal agents?
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
x
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
x

Experimental Design

Experimental Design

We planned to have three groups: a control group and two treatment groups. The difference between them is the type of information they receive.
Group 1. They do not receive information. They will respond directly about the four enforcement rules.
Group 2. They receive information about the average market’s default rate.
Grupo 3. They receive information about the payment process.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Systemic random sampling in each market
Randomization Unit
Vendors
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1224 fresh food market vendors
Sample size: planned number of observations
1224 fresh food market vendors
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
408
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Comite de Etica de Investigacion Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Ecuador
IRB Approval Date
2021-08-27
IRB Approval Number
15.07.2021