Third-Party Performance Pay to Improve Local Government Accountability: A Field Experiment in Burkina Faso

Last registered on February 06, 2023
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Third-Party Performance Pay to Improve Local Government Accountability: A Field Experiment in Burkina Faso
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0010357
Initial registration date
November 07, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 08, 2022, 2:47 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
February 06, 2023, 11:43 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
Burkina Faso
Region
nationwide

Primary Investigator

Name
Malte Lierl
Affiliation
German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Marcus Holmlund
PI Affiliation
World Bank
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2019-01-01
End date
2022-12-19
Keywords
Governance
Additional Keywords
Third-party performance pay, Local governance, Municipal performance, Accountability, Community-based organizations, Blind analysis
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Can local government accountability be improved by giving community-based organizations a financial stake in their local government's performance? In a field experiment in Burkina Faso, we test a "third-party performance pay" scheme for community-based organizations (CBOs). Selected CBOs are promised a variable cash grant that is proportional to changes in their local government's performance scores over a two-year period. We test if third-party performance pay (1) motivates CBOs to actively lobby for better municipal performance, (2) increases accountability and problem-awareness of municipal decision makers and (3) ultimately leads to improvements in municipal government performance. We also investigate if the incentive scheme had any unintended consequences for the internal functioning of the beneficiary CBOs.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Lierl, Malte and Marcus Holmlund. 2023. "Third-Party Performance Pay to Improve Local Government Accountability: A Field Experiment in Burkina Faso." AEA RCT Registry. February 06. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10357-1.2
Sponsors & Partners

Sponsors

Partner

Name
Association les Mains Unis du Sahel (AMUS)
Type
ngo
URL
https://amusburkina.org/
Name
Centre d’études et d’expérimentations économiques et sociales de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CESAO)
Type
ngo
URL
https://cesao-ai.net/
Name
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA)
Type
ngo
URL
http://poverty-action.org/
Name
Programme d'appui aux collectivités territoriales (PACT)
Type
government
URL
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We test a third-party performancy pay (3PPP) scheme that aims to incentivize existing, well-functioning local collective action groups (community-based organizations or CBOs) to hold local governments accountable for their performance. The CBOs are given a direct financial stake in the performance of their local government, by promising them an unconditional cash grant that is proportional to improvements in their municipal government's performance indicators over a two-year period, as measured independently through Burkina Faso's annual municipal performance monitoring survey (SUPERMUN).

Under the 3PPP scheme, the partner CBOs can potentially increase their payoff by nudging their local government to improve its performance. However, since the cash grants are not conditional on any specific actions the CBOs undertake -- even if the CBO does nothing at all, it remains eligible to receive the cash grant -- it incentivizes only those actions the CBO believes to be worth their time and promising enough to have an actual impact on municipal government performance.
Intervention Start Date
2019-08-26
Intervention End Date
2021-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
H1. CBO involvement in municipal governance, H3. Accountability pressure perceived by municipal decision-makers, H5. Municipal government performance
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
See description of outcomes and research hypotheses in the blind analysis report.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
H2. Internal functioning and collective action capacity of CBOs, H4. Municipal decision-makers' awareness of performance metrics
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
See description of outcomes and research hypotheses in the blind analysis report.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
See the research design description in the blind analysis report.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Municipality level: Random assignment blocked by region and anticipated security situation.
CBO level: Random assignment among top two applicants in each municipality.
Randomization was carried out by the PI using an R script. Selection of applicant CBOs was blind to municipality-level treatment assignment.
Randomization Unit
Municipalities, Community-based organizations.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
299 municipalities; 598 community-based organizations (CBOs)
Sample size: planned number of observations
299 municipalities; 1196 municipal decision-makers; 598 group-based CBO surveys; up to 4784 individual CBO members;
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Municipalities: 149 treatment municipalities, 150 control municipalities.
CBOs: 149 treatment CBOs in treatment municipalities, 149 control CBOs in treatment municipalities, 300 control CBOs in control municipalities.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

Documents

Document Name
2013 Concept Note
Document Type
proposal
Document Description
Original research design proposal from 2013, based on research ideas proposed to the government of Burkina Faso and the World Bank.
File
2013 Concept Note

MD5: a8872788c370faad91de0ac3b5a8839b

SHA1: f32ddbb319b462d5c6deb79f2cb4e14ba5872b8f

Uploaded At: November 07, 2022

Document Name
2018 Concept Note
Document Type
proposal
Document Description
Research design proposal indicating research hypotheses prior to implementation of the randomized-controlled trial.
File
2018 Concept Note

MD5: 3f59bd84b510fbbfb5f34e5dd7a62111

SHA1: 4439f15276b34a024a5c0af4a52d6430b3ead93b

Uploaded At: November 07, 2022

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2021-03-26
IRB Approval Number
14598
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Results-Blind Analysis Report

MD5: 9bd38c859cf65e397f9a9715ce91f5d7

SHA1: 1c3d32cab5c10480a019a79ee59b9e52a08f32fd

Uploaded At: November 07, 2022

Replication Code for Results-Blind Analysis Report

MD5: 9eba4612aaf98f6a65a90046fed773df

SHA1: 3bff0f7fc391d36c06e1e66643a5b29034cb087d

Uploaded At: November 07, 2022

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
December 31, 2021, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
Municipalities: 149 treatment, 150 control;
Community-Based Organizations (CBOs): 146 treatment CBOs in treatment municipalities, 142 control CBOs in treatment municipalities, 291 control CBOs in control municipalities;
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
579 community-based organizations;
4361 individual members of community-based organizations;
1057 municipal decision-makers;
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials

Description
Unblinded Results Report
Citation
Lierl, Malte and Marcus Holmlund. 2023. "Third-Party Performance Pay to Improve Local Government Accountability: A Field Experiment in Burkina Faso." AEA RCT Registry. February 06. 2023. "Registration Entry Title: Unblinded Results Report." AEA RCT Registry. February 06 https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10357-1.2
File
Unblinded Results Report.pdf

MD5: 8c89233fbabc3fcd9d89b2b2d96cb6c4

SHA1: f24d261da03f5e4bf9d56730a2a2f8673ba0ae36

Uploaded At: February 06, 2023

Description
Replication Code for Unblinded Results Report
Citation
Lierl, Malte and Marcus Holmlund. 2023. "Third-Party Performance Pay to Improve Local Government Accountability: A Field Experiment in Burkina Faso." AEA RCT Registry. February 06. 2023. "Registration Entry Title: Replication Code for Unblinded Results Report." AEA RCT Registry. February 06 https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10357-1.2
File
CBO UNBLINDED Analysis Replication Code Without Data FOR REGISTRY.zip

MD5: 790f26007d36d4b71a9510b5cd82c08a

SHA1: 2173d44612d4f0384112b3a88fcd684986cfc840

Uploaded At: February 06, 2023