Positive Time Preference and Intergenerational Equity

Respondents decide how to allocate goods over time for varied goods and settings.

2024-02-08

2044-03-31

• The share of a convex budget respondents allocate to the later period for four different settings and five different goods. The settings are long-term, across generations, within generations, and self, and the goods are meals for the homeless, clean water, and cash transfers to low-income Americans for the long-term setting, and money, audio-related work, and video-related work for the other three settings.
• The log-ratio of how much respondents allocate sooner compared to later in each of the four settings and five goods.
• The share of respondents' budgets they allocate to the later period for two different goods, audio and video work tasks, when they simultaneously divide budgets of each good across members of two generations.
• The log-ratio of how much respondents allocate sooner compared to later for two goods, audio and video work tasks, when they simultaneously divide budgets of each good across members of two generations.
• The log-ratio of how much money respondents allocate to a college junior compared to a college senior at the same point in time.
• The log-ratio of how much money respondents allocate sooner compared to later across generations when the older generation will also receive a transfer in the early period.

• Respondents' policy attitudes and donation choices for a set of questions involving intergenerational policies and charities.
• The log-ratio of how much money respondents allocate sooner compared to later within generations when a separate, additional person will get a transfer in the early period.
• The share of a convex budget of money that respondents allocate to a senior now, a junior now, or that junior in a year (when they are a senior), given the choice of how to allocate a budget among all three.

We will present respondents with a series of convex time budget (CTB) decisions, where they allocate some good over time. We vary who receives the good and what the good is. We also introduce some decisions involving multiple people or goods. We carry out each decision for one survey respondent.

Not available

Random number generator on Qualtrics platform.

Respondent

No

596 Social Planners

596 Social Planners; 20 "Citizens" affected by their choices.

298 Social Planners make choices about audio and video; 298 make choices about money and either audio or video (50/50). The order of the three settings (self, within generations, across generations) is evenly randomized across Social Planners, with the additional settings specific to different treatment arms coming immediately after the across-generation choices.

With our current sample size and allocation across treatment arms, we will have 90% power to detect the following: A 1.04% difference between the homeless-meals discount rate and zero. A 1.27% difference between the clean-water discount rate and zero. A 0.92% difference between the cash-transfers discount rate and zero (or the current Circular A-4 recommendation of a 2% discount rate). A 12.40% difference between the one-year monetary discount rate within and across generations (smaller than the difference found in pilots). A 6.02% difference in the elasticity of audio allocations with respect to the video interest rate, and a 13.95% difference in the elasticity o video allocations with respect to the audio interest rate. A 2.51% greater share of a budget allocated to the junior than the senior, or the senior than the junior. A 15.15% elasticity of the amount allocated to a future senior with respect to the amount allocated to them as a junior.