Positive Time Preference and Intergenerational Equity

Last registered on April 02, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Positive Time Preference and Intergenerational Equity
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0012841
Initial registration date
February 12, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 02, 2024, 12:59 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Stanford University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Harvard University

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-02-08
End date
2044-03-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
The optimal policy in a wide array of areas turns on how one weighs benefits to earlier and later generations or cohorts. Using an incentivized survey experiment, we infer respondents' intergenerational social discount rates and compare them to how respondents make decisions for themselves. Respondents allocate resources over time to people in different age cohorts. Respondents choose how many meals to the homeless and how much clean water will be donated now or in twenty years. We use these choices to estimate a social discount rate consistent with respondents' choices. Using a series of further choices, we study whether respondents' social preferences are consistent with the sort of social welfare functions typically used in economic analysis.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Freitas-Groff, Zachary and Karan Makkar. 2024. "Positive Time Preference and Intergenerational Equity." AEA RCT Registry. April 02. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12841-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Respondents decide how to allocate goods over time for varied goods and settings.
Intervention Start Date
2024-02-08
Intervention End Date
2044-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
• The share of a convex budget respondents allocate to the later period for four different settings and five different goods. The settings are long-term, across generations, within generations, and self, and the goods are meals for the homeless, clean water, and cash transfers to low-income Americans for the long-term setting, and money, audio-related work, and video-related work for the other three settings.
• The log-ratio of how much respondents allocate sooner compared to later in each of the four settings and five goods.
• The share of respondents' budgets they allocate to the later period for two different goods, audio and video work tasks, when they simultaneously divide budgets of each good across members of two generations.
• The log-ratio of how much respondents allocate sooner compared to later for two goods, audio and video work tasks, when they simultaneously divide budgets of each good across members of two generations.
• The log-ratio of how much money respondents allocate to a college junior compared to a college senior at the same point in time.
• The log-ratio of how much money respondents allocate sooner compared to later across generations when the older generation will also receive a transfer in the early period.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
• Respondents' policy attitudes and donation choices for a set of questions involving intergenerational policies and charities.
• The log-ratio of how much money respondents allocate sooner compared to later within generations when a separate, additional person will get a transfer in the early period.
• The share of a convex budget of money that respondents allocate to a senior now, a junior now, or that junior in a year (when they are a senior), given the choice of how to allocate a budget among all three.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We will present respondents with a series of convex time budget (CTB) decisions, where they allocate some good over time. We vary who receives the good and what the good is. We also introduce some decisions involving multiple people or goods. We carry out each decision for one survey respondent.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Random number generator on Qualtrics platform.
Randomization Unit
Respondent
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
596 Social Planners
Sample size: planned number of observations
596 Social Planners; 20 "Citizens" affected by their choices.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
298 Social Planners make choices about audio and video; 298 make choices about money and either audio or video (50/50). The order of the three settings (self, within generations, across generations) is evenly randomized across Social Planners, with the additional settings specific to different treatment arms coming immediately after the across-generation choices.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
With our current sample size and allocation across treatment arms, we will have 90% power to detect the following: A 1.04% difference between the homeless-meals discount rate and zero. A 1.27% difference between the clean-water discount rate and zero. A 0.92% difference between the cash-transfers discount rate and zero (or the current Circular A-4 recommendation of a 2% discount rate). A 12.40% difference between the one-year monetary discount rate within and across generations (smaller than the difference found in pilots). A 6.02% difference in the elasticity of audio allocations with respect to the video interest rate, and a 13.95% difference in the elasticity o video allocations with respect to the audio interest rate. A 2.51% greater share of a budget allocated to the junior than the senior, or the senior than the junior. A 15.15% elasticity of the amount allocated to a future senior with respect to the amount allocated to them as a junior.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Administrative Panel on Human Subjects in Non-Medical Research, Stanford University
IRB Approval Date
2022-10-28
IRB Approval Number
42264
Analysis Plan

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